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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ARKANSAS’S CURRENT PROCEDURAL
RULEMAKING CONUNDRUM: ATTEMPTING TO QUELL THE POLITICAL
DISCORD
The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.
Justice Felix Frankfurter1
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a routine surgical procedure, Teresa Broussard discovered
an unusual burn at her incision site accompanied by black and purple lines,
severe pain, and swelling.2 Believing the issues to be attributable to the surgery, Teresa admitted herself to the emergency room where her physician
released her stating that the damaged skin would soon heal.3 Teresa failed to
improve and sloughing dead tissue developed on Teresa’s neck and chest,
forcing her to seek immediate treatment at a burn center.4 Teresa brought
suit against the hospital as well as the doctors and nurses present throughout
her operation, asserting negligent medical treatment during and after her
surgery.5 Despite evidence of negligence, the circuit court granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment because Teresa’s expert witness did
not work within the same precise specialty as the defendant—a procedural
necessity.6
While the right to bring a claim for a civil wrong is one of America’s
constitutional strongholds,7 the difference between a claimant’s successful
recovery and a dismissed claim often hinges on a simple procedural rule.8
Teresa’s failure to comply with such a rule meant that the court granted her
physician’s motion for summary judgment because her experts did not con-

1. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at 2, 386 S.W.3d
385, 387.
3. Id. at 2, 386 S.W.3d at 387.
4. Id. at 3, 386 S.W.3d at 387.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 3–8, 386 S.W.3d at 388–90 (referencing the requirements of ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-114-206(a) (Repl. 2006)).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
8. See, e.g., Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–4, 386 S.W.3d at 387–88; Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d 822, 831; Johnson v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d 135, 141–42; Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 238–39, 253 S.W.3d 415, 420–21 (2007).
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stitute “medical care providers of the same specialty as the defendant.”9
Similar rules of civil procedure have long accompanied substantive laws,
pronouncing the steps required to have a right or duty judicially enforced.10
The seeming accord of Arkansas’s procedural and substantive laws has
recently come to a halt, threatening the state’s system of judicial enforcement.11 Overruling portions of the Arkansas General Assembly’s Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA),12 the Supreme Court of Arkansas has repeatedly
held that various provisions of the CJRA violate the state’s constitutional
grant of procedural rulemaking power to the judiciary.13 Over time, the debate has intensified over the authority to promulgate Arkansas’s rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas currently holds the ultimate power in
declaring Arkansas’s procedural rules.14 Contrary to this system, however,
the General Assembly’s Senate Joint Resolutions Five and Six, introduced
in the 2013 session, proposed a grant of exclusive procedural rulemaking
authority to the Legislature.15 Although neither of the resolutions passed, the
legislature’s notion still stands. These two branches of Arkansas government
must find a way to reconcile their authority with what will best promote the
constitutional rights of plaintiffs and defendants, as well as the core democratic principles of separation of powers and judicial efficiency. Allowing
the court to maintain its rulemaking authority, while permitting the general
assembly to amend or annul new rules by a two-thirds majority of each
house, appears to be a compromise tailored to remedy the current procedural
conundrum.
This note first details Arkansas’s current system of procedural rulemaking and the problem facing the state’s rules of pleading, practice, and
procedure. It then examines the growing discord between the legislature and
the judiciary, analyzing recent case law in light of Arkansas’s CJRA and the
9. Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2, 386 S.W.3d at 387 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16114-206(a)).
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.; ARK. R. CIV. P.; CAL. R. CT.; TENN. R. CIV. P.; TEX. R. CIV.
P.
11. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 2130 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206, -208 to -212 (Repl. 2006)); Broussard,
2012 Ark. 14, at 2, 386 S.W.3d at 387; Bayer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d at 831;
Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d at 141–42; Summerville, 369 Ark. at 239, 253
S.W.3d at 421.
12. 2003 Ark. Acts 2130.
13. See, e.g., Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2, 386 S.W.3d at 387; Bayer, 2011 Ark.
518, at 9–13, 385 S.W.3d at 829–31; Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d at 141–
42; Summerville, 369 Ark. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 421.
14. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3.
15. S.J. Res. 5, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S.J. Res. 6, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
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proposed Senate Joint Resolutions that aimed to vest rulemaking authority
entirely in the General Assembly. Finally, this note proposes that Arkansas
can quell the current procedural rulemaking discord by taking a lesson from
other states and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:16 permit the Supreme
Court of Arkansas to maintain its procedural rulemaking authority, while
providing Arkansas’s General Assembly with amendment and annulment
power exercisable by a two-thirds majority. This system allows judicial and
legislative oversight, thereby complying with the separation of powers doctrine and encouraging judicial efficiency—while protecting the rights of
Arkansas’s citizens.
II. BACKGROUND
Arkansas’s procedural rulemaking system has historically followed the
traditional model, allowing judges to mandate court rules using their handson expertise with pleading, practice, and procedure.17 In recent years, however, procedural reform has become a hot-button issue nationwide,18 and
with Congress’s Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,19 a wave of similar state
acts arose in an effort to address problems of case backlog, delay, excessive
costs, and inefficiency.20 In light of Arkansas’s current system of procedural
rulemaking, the political back-and-forth that has arisen from Arkansas’s
CJRA and its subsequent partial-nullification lay the foundation for the
state’s procedural rulemaking discord.21 This section examines Arkansas’s
current system of procedural rulemaking promulgation, followed by a look
at the political tug-of-war that has arisen from Arkansas’s CJRA and its judicial response.
A.

Arkansas’s Current System of Rulemaking Authority

Amendment 80, which took effect in 2001, delegated Arkansas’s procedural rulemaking power to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: “The Supreme
Court shall prescribe the rules of pleading, practice and procedure for all
16. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.; CAL. R. CT.; TENN. R. CIV. P.; TEX. R. CIV. P.
17. See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893–97 (1999) (discussing the rise of the court rulemaking model throughout the twentieth century).
18. See Courtney A. Nelson, Case Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis
v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in
Arkansas, 59 ARK. L. REV. 781, 781 (2006).
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2013).
20. Bone, supra note 17, at 904; see also State Reforms, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N,
http://www.atra.org/legislation/states (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (presenting an interactive
map of the United States with links to each state’s enacted tort reform statutes).
21. See supra note 11.
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courts; provided these rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as declared in this
Constitution.”22 Amendment 80 also permits the General Assembly, by a
two-thirds vote of the membership of each house, to annul or amend certain
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas.23 However, rules of pleading, practice, and procedure are not listed as amendable or annullable.24 The
General Assembly reaffirmed Amendment 80 in 2003 by enacting Arkansas
Code Annotated section 16-11-301, which states that “[a]ll statutes concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts shall be deemed superseded by rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to . . . Amendment
80.”25
Before Amendment 80’s enactment, Arkansas’s General Assembly
possessed authority to enact statutes addressing procedural issues.26 Against
this legislative power, the Supreme Court of Arkansas struggled to merge its
“constitutional and inherent power to regulate procedure in the courts” with
the simultaneous authority of the General Assembly. 27 At that time, if a statute conflicted with a court-promulgated rule, the court only deferred to the
legislature “when the statutory rule [was] based upon a fixed public policy
which ha[d] been legislatively or constitutionally adopted and ha[d] as its
basis something other than court administration.”28
Amendment 80’s enactment clarified that the judicial branch has the ultimate authority to promulgate procedural rules and that any procedural stat-

22. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3.
23. Id. § 9. Section 5 allows the supreme court to promulgate rules concerning the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Id. § 5. Section 6(B) gives the supreme court control
of the circuit courts. Id. § 6(B). Section 7(B) allows the supreme court to establish “[t]he
jurisdictional amount and the subject matter of civil cases that may be heard in the District
Courts.” Id. § 7(B). Section 7(D) gives the supreme court superintending control of the division of district courts into subject matter divisions. Id. § 7(D). Section 8(A) allows the supreme court to prescribe the duties of circuit court referees or masters. Id. § 8(A). Section
8(B) allows the supreme court to prescribe the duties of district court magistrates. Id. § 8(B).
See also Kimberly J. Frazier, Legislative Note, Arkansas’s Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003:
Who’s Cheating Who?, 57 ARK. L. REV. 651, 668–69 (2004) (emphasizing that the supreme
court’s authority is not subordinate when it comes to procedural rules).
24. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 9; Frazier, supra note 23.
25. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-301 (Repl. 2010); see also Frazier, supra note 23, at 669.
26. See 2 DAVID NEWBERN ET AL., ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:3 (5th
ed. 2013).
27. Id.
28. Citizens for a Safer Carroll Cnty. v. Epley, 338 Ark. 61, 64, 991 S.W.2d 562, 564
(1999) (citing Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994); Curtis v. State, 301 Ark.
208, 212, 783 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1990)); see also Frazier, supra note 23 (indicating that it is
unclear whether the supreme court will continue to defer to the general assembly when the
statute is based on public policy).
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utes promulgated by the legislative branch are superseded by the court’s
rulemaking power.29
B.

Political Discord: Legislature v. Judiciary

Vesting procedural rulemaking authority entirely in the judiciary left
Arkansas’s General Assembly without a voice regarding pleading, practice,
and procedure;30 however, Arkansas’s CJRA purportedly allowed the legislature to impede on the court’s rulemaking power by minimizing so-called
“frivolous lawsuits”31—a concept commonly known as “tort reform.”32
Shortly after the CJRA’s enactment, the Supreme Court of Arkansas declared many of the CJRA’s provisions unconstitutional by examining the
separation of powers and distinguishing the blurred line between substance
and procedure.33
1.

Arkansas’s Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003

The General Assembly enacted the CJRA to remedy conditions “adversely impacting the availability and affordability of medical liability insurance” and to “improve access to the courts for deserving claimants.”34 To
accomplish this, the CJRA made significant procedural changes regarding
nearly every stage of the litigation process: (1) pleadings, (2) venue, (3) allocation of fault among parties and nonparties, (4) bifurcated trials, and (5)
damages.35
Altering Arkansas’s pleading rules,36 the CJRA added the requirement
that a medical malpractice claim must include an affidavit signed by an ex-

29. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3.
30. See NEWBERN ET AL., supra note 26.
31. See Ryan Kent Culpepper, Comment, Justice Reformed: Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., Torts, and the Separation of Powers in Arkansas, 63 ARK. L. REV. 283, 283
(2010).
32. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 2130 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206, -208 to -212 (Repl. 2006)); Culpepper,
supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2,
386 S.W.3d 385, 387; Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d
822, 831; Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d 135,
141–42; Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 239, 253 S.W.3d 415, 421 (2007).
34. 2003 Ark. Acts 2130 at sec. 26; see also Nelson, supra note 18, at 792–93 (showing
that the CJRA’s policy rationale is closely linked with that of Arkansas’s Medical Malpractice Act).
35. See Robert B Leflar, How the Civil Justice Reform Act Changes Arkansas Tort Law,
ARK. LAW., Fall 2003, at 26, 26–27.
36. ARK. R. CIV. P. 7–11.
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pert in the same medical field as the defendant.37 The statute requires that if
this affidavit is not filed within thirty days of the complaint, the case must
be automatically dismissed.38
The CJRA also altered Arkansas’s venue law.39 Prior to 2003, a person
was only subject to a lawsuit in the county of his residence, the county of his
principal place of business, the county where the injury occurred, or in Pulaski County for specified actions involving the State.40 Arkansas’s law now
provides that all civil actions, other than six specifically excluded actions,
may also be brought in the county of the plaintiff’s residence or principal
place of business.41 For medical malpractice actions, however, the CJRA
limited venue to “the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.”42
Concerning personal injury actions, the CJRA replaced Arkansas’s system of joint and several liability43 with a system of several-only liability.44
Prior to the CJRA, if two or more defendants were at fault, a prevailing
plaintiff could collect damages from any liable party, regardless of his or her
percentage of fault.45 Conversely, the CJRA provides that each defendant’s
liability “shall be several only and shall not be joint.”46 Each defendant is
only liable for his or her share of the damages in proportion to his or her
percentage of fault.47 In furtherance of several-only liability, the CJRA also
established a procedure whereby fact finders in personal injury cases must
“consider the fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the . . . injury

37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209(b)(1) (Repl. 2006), invalidated in part by Summerville, 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415.
38. Id. § 16-114-209(b)(3)(B).
39. See id. § 16-55-213 (Repl. 2005); see also Kelly W. McNulty, Ark. Code Ann. § 1655-213: Tort Reform Brings Sweeping Changes to Venue Law in Arkansas, ARK. LAW., Winter 2009, at 10, 10–11 (contrasting Arkansas’s venue law before and after the CJRA’s enactment).
40. McNulty, supra note 39, at 10.
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-213(a)(3); see also McNulty, supra note 39, at 11.
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-213(e).
43. See Crystal Tessaro, Note, NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc.: Lawyers Can
No Longer Bank on Arkansas’s Application of Comparative Fault in Multi-Tortfeasor Cases,
55 ARK. L. REV. 659, 665–68 (2002), for an overview of Arkansas’s system of joint and
several liability before the CJRA’s enactment.
44. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-201 (Repl. 2006); see also Samuel T. Waddell, Comment,
Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant
Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 ARK. L. REV. 485, 485 (2013) (describing the abolishment of joint and several liability and the enactment of fair share liability).
45. See Frazier, supra note 23, at 671.
46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-201(a).
47. Id. § 16-55-201(b)(1).
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. . ., regardless of whether the person or entity was or could have been
named as a party to the suit.”48
Before the CJRA, courts had discretion to order a bifurcated trial according to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.49 Conversely, the CJRA
allows either party to request a bifurcated trial in any case where punitive
damages are sought.50 If the trial is bifurcated, it proceeds in two stages.51
During the first stage of the trial, the fact finder “determine[s] whether compensatory damages are to be awarded.”52 If compensatory damages are
awarded, the second stage begins, during which the fact finder “determine[s]
whether and in what amount punitive damages will be awarded.”53 Evidence
of the defendant’s financial condition is only permitted during the second
stage of the bifurcated trial.54
Finally, the CJRA placed limitations on damages.55 As to punitive
damages, the Act limited plaintiffs’ damages to the greater of $250,000 or
three times the amount of compensatory damages, but no more than $1 million.56 Restricting compensatory damages, the CJRA limited evidence of
damages for the costs of medical care to “those costs actually paid by or on
behalf of the plaintiff,” or those for which the plaintiff or a third party remained responsible.57
Although the CJRA’s beneficiaries are quietly touted as defendants and
their liability insurers,58 the overall purpose of the CJRA was to reduce legislatively perceived excesses in medical liability litigation by targeting procedural law.59 Despite its aim, the effects of the CJRA are felt throughout

48. Id. § 16-55-202(a) (Repl. 2006), invalidated by Johnson v. Rockwell Automation,
Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135; see also Waddell, supra note 44, at 486 (detailing the
subsequent history of the nonparty-fault provision).
49. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-211(a)(1) (Repl. 2006); see also Frazier, supra note 23, at
669–70 (asserting that the CJRA deprives the court of discretion by making bifurcation mandatory in cases requesting punitive damages if any party requests bifurcation more than ten
days before trial).
51. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-211(a)(2).
52. Id. § 16-55-211(a)(2)(A).
53. Id. § 16-55-211(a)(2)(B).
54. Id. § 16-55-211(b).
55. Id. § 16-55-208 (Repl. 2006), invalidated by Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer,
2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822; id. § 16-55-212 (Repl. 2006), invalidated in part by Johnson
v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135.
56. Id. § 16-55-208(a).
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-212(b).
58. See, e.g., Robert B Leflar, The Civil Justice Reform Act and the Empty Chair, 2003
ARK. L. NOTES 67, 67; Nelson, supra note 18, at 792.
59. See Leflar, supra note 58; Nelson, supra note 18, at 792.

112

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Arkansas’s litigation practice, oftentimes far removed from the medical liability arena.60
2.

The Court Interprets the Law: Judicial Fallout

The CJRA’s broad-sweeping effects prompted the Supreme Court of
Arkansas to examine the constitutionality of the Act’s provisions.61 Viewed
in light of Amendment 80 and Arkansas’s separation of powers doctrine, the
court distinguished the line between substance and procedure, holding several of the CJRA’s provisions unconstitutional.62
In Summerville v. Thrower63—four years after the CJRA’s enactment—
the court held unconstitutional the statutory requirement of dismissing medical malpractice actions for failure to timely submit a reasonable cause affidavit.64 The provision’s unconstitutionality stems from its direct conflict
with Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the commencement of an action.65 Examining this conflict, the court defined the line
between substance and procedure:
The boilerplate definition of substantive law is “[t]he part of the law that
creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties,”
while procedural law is defined as “[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for
having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.”66

Two years later, in Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,67 the Supreme Court struck down two more provisions of the CJRA.68 First, the
60. See Leflar, supra note 58.
61. See, e.g., Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2,
386 S.W.3d 385, 387; Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d
822, 831; Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d 135,
141–42; Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 239, 253 S.W.3d 415, 421 (2007).
62. Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2, 386 S.W.3d at 387; Bayer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13,
385 S.W.3d at 831; Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d at 141–42; Summerville,
369 Ark. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 421.
63. 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415 (2007).
64. Id. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 421 (holding that the thirty-day dismissal requirement of
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209(b)(3)(A) (Repl. 2006) is directly in conflict with Rule 3 of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure).
65. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 3; Summerville, 369 Ark. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 421.
66. Summerville, 369 Ark. at 237, 253 S.W.3d at 419–20 (alteration in original) (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443, 1221 (7th ed. 1999)).
67. 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135.
68. Id. at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d at 141–42 (holding that the CJRA’s medical-costs provision, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-212(b) (Repl. 2006), and the CJRA’s nonparty
fault provision, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-202 (Repl. 2006), violated Arkansas’s
constitution).
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court held that the nonparty-fault provision, which required the fact finder to
consider the negligence or fault of nonparties, violated the separation of
powers under the Arkansas Constitution.69 By setting up a procedure to determine the fault of a nonparty and requiring consideration of the nonparty’s
fault, the court ruled that the General Assembly bypassed the court’s rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure.70 Second, the court held unconstitutional
the CJRA’s medical-costs provision, which limited evidence of damages for
the costs of medical care to costs actually paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff, or those for which the plaintiff remained responsible.71 This provision
violates Arkansas’s separation of powers doctrine because determining what
constitutes admissible evidence is a duty constitutionally left to the court’s
discretion.72 The Johnson court added to Summerville’s differentiation between substance and procedure by holding that a legislative provision dictating procedure need not directly conflict with one of the court’s procedural
rules to be unconstitutional.73
Further analyzing the blurred line between substance and procedure in
Cato v. Craighead County Circuit Court,74 the Supreme Court of Arkansas
found a statute providing exemption from civil process for active duty
members of the organized militia75 to be substantive, rather than procedural;
therefore, the statute does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.76 In
its analysis, the court further clarified this doctrine by stating that any statute
that “bypasses our rules of pleading, practice, and procedure by setting up a
procedure of its own . . . violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.”77
In Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer,78 the court struck down yet another CJRA provision when it held that the CJRA’s statutory cap on punitive damages violated the Arkansas Constitution’s prohibition of limiting
damages in personal injury actions.79 Although this CJRA provision did not

69. Id. at 8–9, 308 S.W.3d at 141 (discussing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-202).
70. Id. at 9, 308 S.W.3d at 141.
71. Id. at 10–11, 308 S.W.3d at 142.
72. Id., 308 S.W.3d at 142.
73. See Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141 (referencing Summerville v.
Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 237, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419–20 (2007)); see also NEWBERN ET AL.,
supra note 26 (proposing that the holding in Johnson flows from the exclusivity of the court’s
constitutional rulemaking authority).
74. 2009 Ark. 334, 322 S.W.3d 484.
75. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-62-403 (Repl. 2003).
76. Cato, 2009 Ark. 334, at 7–11, 322 S.W.3d at 488–90.
77. Id. at 8–9, 322 S.W.3d at 489.
78. 2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822.
79. Id. at 11–13, 385 S.W.3d at 830–31 (holding ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (Repl.
2006) unconstitutional).
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raise procedural or separation of powers issues, the court’s holding further
illustrates its willingness to critically examine the CJRA.80
Finally, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held in Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health System, Inc.81 that the statute requiring a medical care
provider of the same specialty, practice, and locality as the defendant to
provide expert testimony in malpractice actions violated the separation of
powers.82 The court determined that this provision creates a procedural law
that is solely within the province of the courts because it does not define
rights or duties, but rather sets witness qualifications.83 The court referenced
City of Fayetteville v. Edmark,84 which states “[t]he trial court controls the
admissibility of evidence and the determination of applicable law and always has the inherent authority to secure the fair trial rights of litigants before it.”85
Since the CJRA’s enactment, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has consistently investigated the Act’s provisions for potential unconstitutionality.86
The court has gone so far as to hold that any statute creating a procedural
rule violates the separation of powers, even if the provision does not directly
conflict with the court’s rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.87
3.

The Legislative Response: Senate Joint Resolutions Five and Six

The 89th General Assembly’s Regular Session convened on January
14, 2013.88 The Arkansas Constitution permits each regular legislative ses-

80. See id., 385 S.W.3d at 830–31.
81. 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385.
82. Id. at 4–8, 386 S.W.3d at 388–90 (holding unconstitutional the portion of ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-114-206(a)(1)–(2) (Repl. 2006) requiring proof of medical negligence “[b]y means
of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the
defendant”).
83. Id. at 6, 386 S.W.3d at 389.
84. 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990).
85. Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 7, 386 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting Edmark, 304 Ark. at 194,
801 S.W.2d at 283).
86. See, e.g., id. at 6–8, 386 S.W.3d at 389–90.; Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer,
2011 Ark. 518, at 9–13, 385 S.W.3d 822, 829–31; Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,
2009 Ark. 241, at 5–11, 308 S.W.3d 135, 139–42; Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231,
237–39, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419–21 (2007).
87. See, e.g., Cato v. Craighead Cnty. Cir. Ct., 2009 Ark. 334, at 8–9, 322 S.W.3d 484,
489; Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141.
88. 89th General Assembly–Regular Session 2013, ARK. ST. LEGISLATURE,
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Nov. 17,
2013); Bob Estes & Jack McNulty, Report on the Regular Session of the 89th General Assembly, ARK. LAW., Summer 2013, at 16, 16.
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sion to refer three constitutional amendments to the people for a vote.89 Proposals for amendments begin in the Senate as Senate Joint Resolutions
(SJR) and in the House of Representatives as House Joint Resolutions
(HJR).90 Senator Eddie Joe Williams (“Senator Williams”) introduced SJR
Five91 and Six92 in an attempt to vest complete procedural rulemaking control in Arkansas’s General Assembly.93 Senator Williams introduced two
resolutions so that if one failed, the other could be amended for a successful
vote.94 Initially, the action was on SJR Six, but then it was abandoned in
favor of SJR Five.95
Both SJRs attempted to achieve essentially the same thing.96 Each proposed revising Amendment 80 to provide that the General Assembly would
prescribe the rules of pleading, practice, and procedure for all courts and
that the Supreme Court of Arkansas would have no authority to promulgate
rules, except as expressly delegated by the legislature.97 The resolutions also
proposed that the General Assembly, as opposed to Supreme Court rule,
would provide the right of appeal to an appellate court from the circuit
courts, along with other rights of appeal.98 After abandoning SJR Six, Senator Williams amended SJR Five to maintain Amendment 80’s grant of rulemaking authority in the Supreme Court, while bestowing authority on the
General Assembly to enact laws that adopt, amend, affect, or supersede the
court’s rules.99 SJR Five added that the General Assembly would be authorized to regulate the award of damages, including punitive damages.100 De89. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 22; see also Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22–23 (describing the constitutional amendments proposed during the Regular Session of the 89th
General Assembly).
90. Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22.
91. S.J. Res. 5, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
92. S.J. Res. 6, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
93. See Joey McCutchen, Protect Our 7th Amendment Rights, SECURE ARK. (Mar. 20,
2013), http://securetherepublic.com/arkansas/2013/03/20/protect-our-7th-amendment-rights/;
see also Jodiane Tritt, Fourth Week of the Session Comes to a Close, ARK. HOSP. ASS’N
LEGIS. BULL. (Ark. Hosp. Ass’n, Little Rock, Ark.), Feb. 8, 2013, at 2, available at
http://www.arkhospitals.org/archive/Legisbulletinpdf/AHALegislativeBulletin02-08-13.pdf
(summing up the fourth week of the legislative session and Senator Williams’s SJR 5 and
SJR 6).
94. See Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 22–23.
97. S.J. Res. 5, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ark. 2013); S.J. Res. 6, 89th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ark. 2013).
98. Ark. S.J. Res. 5 § 3; Ark. S.J. Res. 6 § 3; see also Estes & McNulty, supra note 88,
at 22–23 (describing the constitutional amendments proposed during the Regular Session of
the 89th General Assembly).
99. See Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22–23.
100. Ark. S.J. Res. 5 § 1; see also Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22–23 (describing
the progression of SJR 5 during the Regular Session of the 89th General Assembly).
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spite these alterations, SJR Five did not receive sufficient votes to constitute
one of the three proposed constitutional amendments referred to the people
for a vote.101
4.

Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases

In light of the back-and-forth between the judiciary and the legislature,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas created a Special Task Force on Practice
and Procedure in Civil Cases (“Task Force”).102 The court determined that
the 2013 legislative session, coupled with the recent cases overruling provisions of the CJRA, revealed a need for review and revision of the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure.103
Referencing its process, which allows any member of the bench, bar, or
public to recommend changes to the procedural rules, the court mentioned
that all debating parties had failed to submit concerns or recommendations
to its Committee on Civil Practice.104 Moving past this fact, the court
acknowledged that a thorough examination of the concerns raised by these
debates warranted the creation of the Task Force.105
In its January 10, 2014 report, the Task Force proposed changes to seven existing rules and recommended the adoption of one new rule.106 The
report’s two major proposals concerned allocation of nonparty fault and
Rule 11 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.107 In its final report—
issued on January 30, 2014—the Task Force additionally recommended
amending Rule 702 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence108 by adding a “same
101. Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 23.
102. In re The Appointment of a Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil
Cases, 2013 Ark. 303, at 1–2, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1–2 (per curiam).
103. Id. at 1, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1.
104. Id. at 1–2, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1–2.
105. Id., 2013 WL 3973978, at *1–2.
106. In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases, 2014 Ark. 5, at 1–
9, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *1–17 (per curiam).
107. Id. at 3–7, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *6–14.
108. ARK. R. EVID. 702. The current rule reads as follows: “If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Id. The Task
Force recommended adding the following subdivision:
(b) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, a witness in an
action for medical injury may testify as to the applicable standard of care, compliance with that standard, and failure to act in accordance with that standard only if:
(1) the witness is a medical care provider of the same specialty as the person
whose conduct is at issue when that person is a physician, dentist, or other health
care professional for whom areas of specialization are commonly recognized; or
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specialty” requirement for experts in medical injury actions reminiscent of
section 16-114-206 of the Arkansas Code, which was held unconstitutional
in Broussard.109
For allocation of nonparty fault, the Task Force recommended requiring a defendant to assert a contribution claim within the party’s answer. 110
The fact finder would then be charged with determining the nonparty’s pro
rata share of responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages.111 Concerning actions
for personal injury, medical injury, wrongful death, or property damage, the
fact finder would determine the fault of both parties and nonparties who
may have liability for the plaintiff’s harm under two circumstances: (1) the
plaintiff settles with a nonparty; or (2) the defendant asserts a contribution
claim within his or her answer and the defendant meets the burden of establishing a prima facie case of the nonparty’s fault.112
The recommended changes to Rule 11 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure follow the language of Rule 11’s counterpart appellate rule,113
proposing a nonexclusive list of seven sanctions available to the trial
court.114 Under proposed Rule 11.1, the plaintiff must append to the complaint a certificate stating that he has consulted a qualified expert who believes there is a good faith basis for setting forth the claim.115
In its final report, the Task Force recommended altering the requirements of medical injury experts who testify “as to the applicable standard of
care.”116 The suggested amendment adds a “same specialty” requirement for
experts when the defendant is a “health care professional for whom areas of
specialization are commonly recognized.”117 When the defendant is employed in a nonspecialized health care profession, however, an expert must

(2) the witness is a medical care provider with the same type of professional license, certificate, registration, or other authorization as the person whose conduct
is at issue when that person is a health care professional for whom areas of specialization are not commonly recognized.
In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Final Report, 2014 Ark.
47, at 3, 11 (per curiam).
109. In re Special Task Force—Final Report, 2014 Ark. 47, at 3–11, 2014 Ark. LEXIS
122, at *2–13 (discussing the holding in Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc.,
2012 Ark. 14, at 7, 386 S.W.3d 385, 389 and the same-specialty requirement in Arkansas).
110. In re Special Task Force, 2014 Ark. 5, at 4, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *4.
111. Id. at 2, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *4–6.
112. Id., 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *5–6.
113. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 11 (stating the sanctions available for frivolous appeals and
other misconduct).
114. See In re Special Task Force, 2014 Ark. 5, at 4–5, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *9–12.
115. Id. at 5, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *11.
116. In re Special Task Force—Final Report, 2014 Ark. 47, at 3–11, 2014 Ark. LEXIS
122, at *2–13 (per curiam).
117. Id. at 9, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *11.
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only be “a medical care provider with the same type of professional license,
certificate, registration, or other authorization” as the defendant.118
The Supreme Court subsequently referred the Task Force’s proposed
rules to its Committee on Civil Practice (“Committee”) and published them
for comment.119 The Committee reviewed the proposed rules, along with
numerous comments from the bench, bar, and public, and submitted a report
to the court.120 On August 7, 2014, the Supreme Court of Arkansas issued
three separate per curiam orders addressing the work of the Committee and
the Task Force.121
The first order adopted the Committee’s proposed changes to Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 49, and 52 concerning allocation of fault to absent alleged tortfeasors.122 The amendment permits fact finders to assess
fault against nonparties as well as parties with whom the plaintiff settles
outside of court.123 In a dissenting opinion with which Justice Karen R.
Baker joined, Justice Josephine Linker Hart maintained the following in
light of the newly adopted rules:
First, the rules are unclear. Second, the rules are unfair. Third, the rules
may not survive further constitutional scrutiny. Fourth, there are other
solutions.
....
Furthermore, in adopting this labyrinthine set of rules governing allocation of fault, we venture into the creation of substantive law, not procedural law, and we, ourselves, violate the dictates of separation of powers.
Had the majority sought to effect a procedural rule, they could have done
so by providing a simple jury instruction advising the jury not to allocate
to the defendant the fault of any other entity and to allocate to the de118. Id. at 9–10, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *11–12.
119. In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Ark. R. Civ. P. 9,
49, 52, & Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 8, 2014 Ark. 340, at 1, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *1 (per curiam).
120. Id., 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *1.
121. See In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Proposed
Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 & 42, 2014 Ark. 344, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 438 (per curiam);
In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Proposed Amendment to
Ark. R. Civ. P. 3, 2014 Ark. 343, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 437 (per curiam); In re Special Task
Force—Ark. R. Civ. P. 9, 49, 52, & Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 8, 2014 Ark. 340, 2014 Ark. LEXIS
439; see also Brian G. Brooks, Adventures in Rule Making: The Court Struggles to Make
Sense Out of Non-Party Fault, and Other Outgrowth From Tort Reform—A Guest Blog Post
by Brian G. Brooks, REPORTED DECISIONS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://reporteddecisions.com/
2014/08/08/adventures-in-rule-making-the-court-struggles-to-make-sense-out-of-non-partyfault-and-other-outgrowth-from-tort-reform-a-guest-blog-post-by-brian-g-brooks/.
122. In re Special Task Force—Ark. R. Civ. P. 9, 49, 52, & Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 8, 2014
Ark. 340, at 1–2, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *1–4.
123. Id. at 4–11, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *4–14.
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fendant only the fault attributable to the defendant’s acts or omissions,
thus avoiding the problems engendered by the adoption of these rules. 124

Justice Hart’s dissent highlights the implications of the language “may
have . . . liability”—precisely how far does this new language extend?125
“Does it include those who are immune, those who are outside the long-arm
jurisdiction of the Court, and those who are protected by the Workers’
Compensation bar?”126 Despite Justice Hart’s dissent, the amendments to
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 49, and 52 will go into effect on January 1, 2015.127
The court’s second and third per curiam opinions sought further comments on the proposed amendments to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 3,
11, and 42.128 The court suggested an amendment to Rule 3 “providing for
presuit notice for medical-malpractice cases, [which] would be effective
upon the General Assembly’s enactment of a companion limitations-tolling
provision.”129 As to Rule 11, the court suggested that “when a party’s claim
or affirmative defense may only be established in whole or in part by expert
testimony,” the attorney’s signature on the pleading or motion certifies that
“the party has consulted with at least one expert, or has learned in discovery
of the opinion of at least one expert” who is “competent” and who determines that “there is a reasonable basis to assert the claim or affirmative defense.”130 Finally, the court proposed an amendment to Rule 42, which provided in its addition to the Reporter’s Notes that “[t]he circuit court, in the
exercise of its discretion, determines whether liability for punitive damages
is to be decided in the first or second phase of the bifurcated proceeding.”131
As the comment period expired on September 30, 2014, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas will issue another per curiam opinion concerning its adoption of
the changes to Rules 3, 11, and 42.132
124. Id. at 14, 18, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *17, 22–23 (Hart, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 14–15, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *17–18.
126. Brooks, supra note 121.
127. In re Special Task Force—Ark. R. Civ. P. 9, 49, 52, & Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 8, 2014
Ark. 340, at 2–3, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *3.
128. See In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Proposed
Amendment to Ark. R. Civ. P. 3, 2014 Ark. 343, at 1, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 437, at * 1 (per
curiam); In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Proposed
Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 & 42, 2014 Ark. 344, at 2–3, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 438, at
*2–3 (per curiam).
129. In re Special Task Force—Proposed Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 3, 2014 Ark.
343, at 1, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 437, at * 1.
130. In re Special Task Force—Proposed Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 & 42, 2014
Ark. 344, at 1–2, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 438, at *1–2.
131. Id. at 8–10, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 438, at *10–12.
132. On November 2, 2014, the date of this note’s completion, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas had not yet issued its per curiam opinion. See In re Special Task Force—Proposed
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III. ARGUMENT
Quelling the current procedural discord requires a new formulation of
Arkansas’s system of rulemaking. By examining various models in light of
Amendment 80 and Arkansas’s separation of powers doctrine, this note asserts that a mixed-branch approach to rulemaking is the best course of action.
This section first discusses the arguments for both purely legislative
and purely judicial forms of procedural rulemaking. The note then examines
the federal model of procedural rulemaking, as well as the processes adopted by various states, to demonstrate why the majority of jurisdictions follow
a mixed approach. Finally, this section illustrates how using both Arkansas’s
Supreme Court and General Assembly to promulgate procedural rules will
properly effectuate substance and comply with the state’s separation of
powers doctrine.
A.

Purely Legislative, Purely Judicial, or a Mixed Approach?

Contrary to the majority of models, a multitude of arguments exist for
both purely legislative and purely judicial rulemaking authority.133 Courts in
over twenty states appear to have exclusive authority to adopt rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.134 The source of this authority ranges from constitutional provisions, to common law authority, to statutory grant, to a
combination of the three.135 Although no state maintains a system of purely
legislative procedural rulemaking, SJR Five and SJR Six would have insti-

Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 3, 2014 Ark. 343, at 1, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 437, at * 1; In re
Special Task Force—Proposed Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 & 42, 2014 Ark. 344, at 3,
2014 Ark. LEXIS 438, at *3.
133. See, e.g., Bruce L. Dean, Comment, Rule-Making in Texas: Clarifying the Judiciary’s Power to Promulgate Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 139, 149–51
(1988); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial RuleMaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–14 (1958); Roscoe
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 43–46 (1952);
Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reform Violates the
Fundamental Federal Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers: How to Restore the
Right Balance, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 907–08 (2001).
134. CHRISTOPHER REINHART & GEORGE COPPOLO, COURT RULES IN OTHER STATES—
LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL, 2008-R-0430, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGIS. RES. (2008),
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0430.htm (providing a summary and
table listing every state’s system of procedural rulemaking).
135. Id.
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tuted such a system, and arguments exist encouraging this form of procedural rulemaking.136
1.

Purely Legislative v. Purely Judicial Rulemaking

Traditionally, the legislative branch is vested with the authority to create and enact law.137 As this branch is elected “of the people, by the people,
[and] for the people,”138 it seems logical to extend the legislature’s authority
to procedural rules. Victor Schwartz, coauthor of the most widely used torts
casebook in the United States, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz’s Torts: Cases
and Materials,139 illustrates the quintessential argument in favor of vesting
rulemaking authority in the legislature:
It is not rocket science, but a high school civics lesson showing that the
legislative branch makes or creates law, the executive branch enforces
the law, and courts interpret the law. The government works best when
each branch respects the role of the others.
Unfortunately, that mutual respect has broken down in the past decade in
the area of civil justice.140

Additional arguments in favor of a purely legislative form of procedural rulemaking include judicial resistance, judicial bias, the perception that
judges might be out of touch with the needs of litigants and attorneys, a belief that the legislature better reflects the public will, and concerns that judicial rulemaking might inhibit or unreasonably broaden substantive rights.141
Conversely, as the majority of state supreme courts are endowed with
primary procedural rulemaking authority, purely judicial rulemaking is not
without its own supporting arguments: judicial freedom from political pressures, judicial expertise with procedural issues, avoidance of legislative delay to enact needed procedural changes, public expectation of judicial efficiency, the ability to make minor rule changes without undergoing complete
136. See, e.g., Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 907–08 (arguing that judicial nullification of civil justice reforms erodes the fundamental balance of powers between courts and
legislatures).
137. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1001 (3d ed. 1998) (describing the development of court rulemaking from nineteenth century England to modern America).
138. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/gettyb.asp.
139. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (12th ed. 2010); see also Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 907 n.a1 (describing the textbook as the most widely used in America).
140. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 907.
141. Dean, supra note 133, at 151.
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procedural reform, and consistent interpretation of rules by the body that
created them.142
Although some argue that judicial rulemaking may create or inhibit
substantive rights, inefficient procedures created by a legislature that does
not deal with the court system on a daily basis are more likely to restrict
these rights.143 Because courts see these faulty rules firsthand, they should
have the authority to change the rules quickly and effectively.144 Anything
but quick and effective, mass legislative reform takes years to filter through
the legislative system and is the epitome of judicial inefficiency.145 Judicial
efficiency instead requires necessary minor amendments according to the
experience of judges and the suggestions of attorneys and litigants.146 Requiring these small changes to compete for legislative attention is both inefficient and unlikely to successfully procure effective procedure.147
As this proposal suggests, because small procedural modifications
would be promulgated after committee suggestions and through the expertise of a qualified bench of judges, “[t]he chances of any high-handed infringement of substantive rights . . . are too small to be taken seriously.” 148
However, if a rule managed to impinge on a substantive right, abiding by the
proposal suggested by this note, the legislature could amend or annul the
rule by a two-thirds majority of each house.
In addition to legislative inefficiency, many of the pro-legislativerulemaking arguments—judicial resistance to change, judicial bias, out-oftouch judges, and the perception that the legislature better reflects the public
will149—are nullified by the fact that the seven justices of the Supreme Court
of Arkansas are elected by the general public.150 Section 16 of Amendment
80 describes the qualifications for an Arkansas Supreme Court justice: (1) a
justice must be a licensed attorney in Arkansas “for at least eight years immediately preceding the date of assuming office”, and (2) the justice must be
elected by the general public to serve an eight-year term.151
As Arkansas’s justices are elected according to public will, if a change
is necessary to encourage a more efficient court system, a judge will likely
142. Dean, supra note 133, at 149–51.
143. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 10–11.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 11.
147. See id.
148. Pound, supra note 133, at 46.
149. Dean, supra note 133, at 151 (comparing judicial rulemaking power with legislative
rulemaking power).
150. Arkansas Supreme Court, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/courts/
supreme-court (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (describing the election process for justices and
the jurisdiction and power of the court).
151. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 16(A), (D).
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be anything but resistant to that change; an ineffective system only creates
more strain on the judicial process, the brunt of which falls on judges.152 A
judge who has been a licensed attorney for a minimum of eight years will
not suddenly be out of touch with the needs of litigants and attorneys. 153
Additionally, Arkansas’s Committee on Civil Practice directly advises judges of the needs of litigants and attorneys.154 If the judiciary decided to ignore
those needs, the legislative oversight proposed by this note would allow
Arkansas’s General Assembly to amend or annul the erroneous rule.
2.

A Model Examination

The federal model and the majority of state models bestow authority on
both the judiciary and the legislature, vesting primary rulemaking power in
the courts.155 Allowing the Supreme Court of Arkansas to continue promulgating rules of pleading, practice, and procedure, while granting the General
Assembly amendment and annulment powers, permits the benefits of both
the federal model and the state majority model. In light of the various aspects of successful court rulemaking, Arkansas’s movement to a more evenhanded system would promote the system of checks and balances and encourage judicial efficiency.156
a.

The federal model

The federal model allows both the judicial and legislative branches to
effectuate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.157 The Supreme Court
of the United States, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act,158 promulgates the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which are subject to Congressional approval.159 While the primary responsibility for rule development lies in
judicial committees, Congress has seven months to veto promulgated rules
before they become part of the FRCP.160 The commentary to 28 U.S.C. §
152. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 11 (detailing the issues that can arise
from ineffective court procedure).
153. See generally Arkansas Supreme Court, supra note 150 (describing the qualifications for Arkansas Supreme Court justices).
154. In re The Appointment of a Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil
Cases, 2013 Ark. 303, at 1, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1 (per curiam) (outlining the structure of
Arkansas’s Committee on Civil Practice).
155. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074 (2013); REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134.
156. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 42.
157. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074.
158. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100–702, § 401, 102
Stat. 4642, 4648–50 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2013)).
159. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 137.
160. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 137, § 1001 n.18.
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2074 describes the Congressional approval procedure as “passive.”161 In
other words, “[i]nertia means approval. If Congress does nothing within the
seven-month period stipulated by the statute, the new rules go into effect.”162
The federal system allows both judicial and legislative rulemaking involvement pursuant to the following structure: (1) the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, composed of judges, lawyers, and law professors appointed
by the chief justice,163 proposes an amendment; (2) the proposal is reviewed
by the Supreme Court’s Committee on Practice and Procedure; (3) the
amendment is circulated to the public for comment; (4) the proposal returns
to the Advisory Committee, which may make additional changes; (5) the
final draft is approved by both the Advisory Committee and the Committee
on Practice and Procedure and is forwarded to the United States Judicial
Conference; (6) if accepted by the Judicial Conference, the proposed
amendment is submitted to the Supreme Court; and (7) after promulgation
by the Supreme Court, the new rule becomes effective the following December 1, unless Congress takes action to amend or annul it.164
Abiding by this process allows the Supreme Court to create rules that
further an efficient judicial system,165 as opposed to rules that are procedurally inefficient or unfeasible.166 Along with promoting judicial efficiency,
the federal system simultaneously allows Congress to ensure that the rules
do not impinge on or create any substantive rights;167 therefore, Congress’s
ability to approve, amend, or annul the procedural rules allows an important
check and balance to occur.168
As the judiciary remains the branch most affected by the procedural
rules, allowing a committee composed of legal professionals who deal with
procedure daily ensures that the rules encourage effective courts. Similar to
the federal model’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, nearly four decades
ago the Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted a process that “allows any
member of the bench, bar, or general public to suggest changes . . . or provide input on” the court’s procedural rules.169 A committee composed of
both plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys reviews the suggestions and submits
161. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074 cmt. (West 2006).
162. Id.
163. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 6–7 (1958).
164. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 137, § 1001 n.18.
165. See Bone, supra note 17, at 924–25.
166. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 10–11.
167. See generally id. at 18–20 (considering why procedural rules intimately tied with
substantive implications require legislative review).
168. See id. at 42. See generally Bone, supra note 17, at 892–93 (describing the checks
and balances inherent within the federal court rulemaking model).
169. See In re The Appointment of a Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil
Cases, 2013 Ark. 303, at 1, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1 (per curiam).
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them to the court for consideration.170 Although the court can bypass committee consideration, this system allows the rulemaking process to consider
not only judicial expertise and legislative oversight but also recommendations of the people who practice according to the rules on a daily basis.171
Subsequent to the committee’s suggestions, the Supreme Court of Arkansas determines whether to promulgate a new or revised procedural
rule.172 Adhering to the federal model, if Arkansas’s General Assembly had
the opportunity to alter or reject newly proposed rules, each proposal would
have a further check on its potential impact on substantive rights.173 This
check and balance would allow both branches to have a say while promoting
judicial efficiency and complying with Arkansas’s constitutional requirement that the state’s Supreme Court prescribe procedural rules.
If Arkansas shadowed the federal model, following approval and
promulgation by its supreme court, the rule or amendment would be sent to
the General Assembly for approval, amendment, or rejection.174 Like the
federal model, approval would be passive—if not immediate175—while
amendment or rejection would require a two-thirds majority of both houses
by the next legislative session.176 This mixed approach allows both branches
to voice their concerns while preventing each from overstepping its power.177
b.

State models

Courts are authorized to adopt procedural rules in nearly every state.178
In most of these states, the legislature also plays a role in procedural rulemaking.179 According to a 2008 report on procedural rules, approximately
thirty states provide some role for the legislature in regard to promulgating
court rules, but no state vests rulemaking authority entirely in the legislature.180 Although the courts in approximately twenty states have exclusive
authority to adopt procedural rules, each state’s approach varies from the

170. See id., 2013 WL 3973978, at *1.
171. See id. at 1–2, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1–2.
172. See id. at 2, 2013 WL 3973978, at *2.
173. See generally Bone, supra note 17, at 892–93 (describing the checks and balances
inherent within the federal court rulemaking model).
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2013); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 137, § 1001 n.18.
175. See 28 U.S.C.A. cmt. § 2074 (West 2006).
176. See generally Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 37–40 (urging that procedural
rules should be the product of both the court and the legislature).
177. See REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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next.181 Despite this variation, it is clear that a combination of judicial and
legislative input is the stronghold of the majority’s method of procedural
rulemaking.182
Florida, for example, allows definitive legislative oversight of judicial
rules through the legislature’s annulment power.183 The state’s constitution
explicitly gives its supreme court power to adopt rules of practice and procedure, but the “[r]ules of court may be repealed by general law enacted by
two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.”184 This
system of amendment and annulment power falls fairly in line with the federal system.185 Allowing this form of legislative oversight ensures that the
proposed rules comply with the state’s constitution and allows a further
check on the rule’s potential implications.
Similar to Florida’s system, Texas’s constitution empowers its supreme
court to adopt rules of administration and procedure.186 The state’s constitution also provides that the court’s procedural rules must be consistent with
the state’s laws, which means that Texas’s legislature still reserves the power to annul or amend the court’s rules by operation of law.187 Again, this
system follows the majority pattern, permitting legislative oversight.
Departing from a system of mere amendment and annulment power,
Tennessee’s proposed procedural rules do not take effect until they are reported to the state’s General Assembly and approved by a resolution of both
houses.188 Regarding the court’s ability to propose rules, “Tennessee’s constitution does not explicitly address the power to make rules of practice” and
procedure.189 Although the state’s courts have discussed its inherent rulepromulgation authority,190 Tennessee’s statutes grant its courts the power to
adopt rules, which must be approved by the legislature.191 This system allows more legislative oversight than most because enacting a rule requires
the approval of each house. Despite the house resolution requirement, Tennessee’s system still complies with the majority of states by allowing legislative oversight of the court’s proposed procedural rules.

181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a); see also REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134.
184. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
185. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
186. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(a)–(b).
187. See id. § 31(b).
188. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-404 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.).
189. REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134.
190. See, e.g., Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 340–42 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Brackett,
869 S.W.2d 936, 939–40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
191. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-401 to -404 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg.
Sess.).
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Unique in its approach, California empowers a judicial council to adopt
rules for court administration, practice, and procedure.192 The state’s constitution directly endows a judicial council, comprised of judges, members of
the state bar, and one member of each house of the legislature, with this
power.193 Although the rules must comply with the state’s statutes, California does not appear to bestow approval, amendment, or annulment powers
on the legislature.194 Nonetheless, this system gives the legislature limited
oversight of procedural rulemaking by allowing a member of each house to
sit on the judicial council.195 Although this check on judicial power may
seem minimal, it still constitutes a more stringent check and balance than
Arkansas’s current system.
While differences exist in nearly every state’s model of procedural
rulemaking, legislative oversight and compliance with the state’s other laws
are the strongholds of an overwhelming majority.196 Permitting both judicial
and legislative involvement in Arkansas’s rules of civil procedure would
coincide with the majority model, thereby allowing a system of checks and
balances to ensure effective courts.
B.

Benefits of a Mixed Rulemaking Approach in Arkansas

Adhering to the proposal suggested by this note takes advantage of the
judicial benefits, while allowing many legislative benefits as well. Although
neither scheme on its own is without reason, in Arkansas, Amendment 80
mandates that the Supreme Court hold ultimate procedural rulemaking authority.197 Therefore, to encompass the benefits of both systems, vesting
Arkansas’s General Assembly with legislative oversight of procedure is a
compromise allowing the best aspects of both schemes to flourish.
This mixed approach retains the advantages of both the purely judicial
and purely legislative system while simultaneously reducing the risks involved with each.198 To achieve such an approach, the following sets forth
the requisite consideration:
[T]he terms under which rule-making may be entrusted to the courts, and
the scope and conditions of legislative veto if one is to be provided, can
be formulated only after inquiring why the vesting of rule-making power
in the judiciary is intrinsically sound, what, specifically, are the ad192. See REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
193. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
194. See id.; see also REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134.
195. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(a).
196. See REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134.
197. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3.
198. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 10 (describing the ideal system of procedural rulemaking).
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vantages promised, and what dangers or disadvantages run with the
grant. To retain the advantages while reducing the risks is to approach
the ideal.199

Vesting rulemaking authority in Arkansas’s judiciary is intrinsically
sound because the citizens elect their judges in statewide nonpartisan elections.200 As members of the bar working within the court system on a daily
basis, these individuals have the necessary experience with procedural issues and a desire to improve the rules of pleading, practice, and procedure to
create better access to justice for Arkansas’s citizens. The concern of allowing nonlawmakers to promulgate court procedure would be lessened by the
General Assembly’s ability to amend or annul unreasonable rules.
This mixed system would permit Arkansas’s General Assembly to
amend and annul unreasonable rules, but only by a supermajority. The twothirds majority requirement will likely prevent unreasonable amendments
and annulments from occurring and require that the disputed rule or
amendment necessitate legislative interference.
1.

The Separation of Powers

This proposal’s constitutional soundness emanates from its compliance
with Arkansas’s separation of powers doctrine, which provides the following:
The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas shall be divided
into three distinct departments, each of them to be confided to a separate
body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which are legislative, to one, those
which are executive, to another, and those which are judicial, to another.
No person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments,
shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others . . . .201

As the CJRA and its subsequent partial nullification have shown, the
fundamental balance of powers must be restored between the judicial and
legislative branches.202 This balance requires that the legislature creates law
while the judiciary interprets it.203 Within the procedural rulemaking arena,
however, the traditional view has permitted courts to promulgate the narrowly tailored area of procedure because of the court’s familiarity and ex-

199. Id.
200. See generally Arkansas Supreme Court, supra note 150 (describing the election
process for justices and the jurisdiction and power of the court).
201. ARK. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–2.
202. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 938.
203. See id. at 907.
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pertise with what constitutes an efficient court system. 204 Due to this allowance, the notion that the legislature creates substantive rules and the judiciary creates procedural rules is accepted as compliant with the separation of
powers doctrine.205
Unwilling to accept this extension of judicial power, various commentators see the judiciary’s exercise of rulemaking authority as an overstepping
of its distinct governmental role.206 Overruling this strict interpretation,
however, Amendment 80’s express grant of procedural rulemaking authority
to the judiciary extends the judicial branch’s power to include that of court
rule promulgation.207 Because of both the traditional view and Amendment
80, Arkansas’s delegation of rulemaking authority to the judiciary is appropriate.
Contrary to Arkansas’s Constitution, portions of the General Assembly’s CJRA violated the separation of powers doctrine because the Act created rules that are constitutionally left to the court’s discretion.208 Similarly,
vesting rulemaking authority completely in the legislature, as SJR Five and
Six attempted to do, violates the separation of powers as Arkansas’s judiciary has interpreted it. Providing the legislature with a form of amendment
and annulment power would appear to more evenhandedly balance the authority between Arkansas’s Supreme Court and General Assembly. The
court would maintain its constitutional grant of procedural rulemaking authority while allowing the legislature to amend or annul any rules that appeared to expand, create, or impinge on substantive rights.
2.

Procedure Effectuates Substance

No hard and fast line exists between procedure and substance.209 Although Arkansas’s courts have attempted to define the line, it is undeniable
that procedural rules have substantive effects.210 For instance, pleading requirements, if left unmet, will inherently prevent a party from setting forth a
substantive claim worthy of judicial intervention.211
Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure are intended to prescribe the
steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced.212 Court rule makers are
204. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 10.
205. See id. at 33.
206. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 917–20.
207. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3.
208. See id.
209. See Bone, supra note 17, at 909–14.
210. See id.
211. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 7–11.
212. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.; ARK. R. CIV. P.; CAL. R. CT.; TENN. R. CIV. P.; TEX. R. CIV.
P. See also supra Part III.A.2.b.
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inevitably better suited to integrate and maintain a system of court procedure
that will enable the legislature’s substantive rules to flourish:213 “[s]o long as
court rule[-]makers stick to their area of special competence—inferring general principles from existing practice and choosing rules that implement
those principles well in light of practice realities—they act legitimately.”214
As the line between substance and procedure is a thin one, however,
bestowing amendment and annulment authority on the General Assembly
would ensure that the court’s procedure does not impede on or create any
substantive rights. Additionally, requiring the procedural rules to comply
with the constitution and statutory law would prevent the rules from infringing on any previously existing substantive rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the court is required to enforce justice, it must maintain the power
and ability to do so.215 Although the courts must always adhere to substantive law, loading them with legislated procedural requirements will do nothing but prevent substantive law from being successfully enforced.216 The fact
remains that the Supreme Court of Arkansas has instant familiarity with the
day-to-day practice of the courts.217 The judiciary should be permitted to
continue enacting procedural changes simply and without the delay massive
legislative interference would inevitably cause.218 As this note has addressed, however, the political discord between both branches mandates a
reformulation of Arkansas’s current procedural rulemaking system.
Although Arkansas’s General Assembly currently has amendment and
annulment power of rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to certain
sections of Amendment 80, the procedural rulemaking power is not one of
the sections specified.219 Under Amendment 80, “[a]ny rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court pursuant to Sections 5, 6(B), 7(B), 7(D), or 8 of this
Amendment may be annulled or amended, in whole or in part, by a twothirds (2/3) vote of the membership of each house of the General Assembly.”220 Amending section 9 to encompass annulment and amendment pow213. See Bone, supra note 17, at 955.
214. Id.
215. See Pound, supra note 133, at 45–46.
216. See id.
217. See generally Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 10 (asserting that legislatures
lack instant familiarity with the inner workings of courts).
218. See generally id. at 10–11 (suggesting that legislative procedural reform is undeniably inefficient).
219. See NEWBERN ET AL., supra note 26.
220. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 9. Section 5 allows the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Id. § 5. Section 6(B) gives
the Supreme Court control of the circuit courts. Id. § 6(B). Section 7(B) allows the jurisdic-
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ers over the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority would quell the current
discord by allowing both the judicial and legislative branch to effectuate
Arkansas’s rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.
The proposal suggested by this note would allow the Supreme Court of
Arkansas to maintain its rulemaking authority, while also permitting Arkansas’s General Assembly to amend or annul new rules by a two-thirds majority of each house. Legislative approval of new rules would be passive—
effective upon promulgation by the Supreme Court—and require disapproval of a supermajority by the end of the following legislative session. Adhering to the federal model and the state majority rule, this system would allow
both branches to oversee the rules, while complying with the separation of
powers and encouraging judicial efficiency—essential components of protecting Arkansans’ right to justice.
Sevawn Foster*

tional amount and the subject matter of civil cases that may be heard in the district courts to
be established by Supreme Court rule. Id. § 7(B). Section 7(D) gives the Supreme Court
superintending control of the division of district courts into subject matter divisions. Id. §
7(D). Section 8 allows the Supreme Court to prescribe the duties of circuit court referees or
masters. Id. § 8(A). Section 8 also allows the Supreme Court to prescribe the duties of district
court magistrates. Id. § 8(B).
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